• Board Considerations in the Context of a Business Combination Transaction

    by  • August 21, 2012 • 0 Comments

    When contemplating a merger, sale, or acquisition, there are a number of matters for directors to consider. From a legal perspective, one of the primary concerns with pre-combination actions taken by the board is ensuring that the transaction will receive the benefit of the business judgment rule.

    A Quick Review of the Business Judgment Rule

    The business judgment rule is a principle which, absent special circumstances, such as a conflict of interest, provides that courts will presume the propriety of directors’ decisions.

    Delaware’s business judgment rule creates a presumption that directors’ decisions were made by disinterested and independent directors who acted in subjective good faith, and employed a reasonable decision making process. Under those circumstances, the directors’ decisions are reviewed not for reasonableness, but for rationality: a director will not be held liable for unreasonable decisions so long as the decision is rational.

    In order to overcome the business judgment rule presumption, a plaintiff must effectively demonstrate that the board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision, breached any one of its triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith, due care.

    Important Considerations

    Directors that contemplate the following issues will be more likely to secure the protection of the business judgment rule:

    1. Do any of the parties involved have personal relationships or other conflicts which would give rise to questioning the duty of loyalty?
    2. Do the directors have as much information regarding the transaction as is reasonably available?
    3. Have the directors thoroughly reviewed the information collected?
    4. Have the directors sought expert advice from lawyers, bankers, and accountants to ensure they have a firm grasp of the transaction?
    5. Have the directors contemplated the merits of alternative options, including the option of completely walking away from the transaction and not seeking alternative deals?
    6. Have the directors openly debated the merits of the transaction amongst themselves?
    7. Do the directors understand all the material terms of the agreement and alternative terms that might be included in the agreement, including pricing terms, conditions to closing, restrictions prior to closing, “no shop” provisions, and “break up” provisions?
    8. Do the directors understand the tax consequences of the transaction?
    9. Are the directors aware of all the relevant regulatory restrictions?
    10. Do the shareholders have a right to vote on the transaction?
    11. Do the directors understand the confidentiality terms of the transaction negotiations?
    12. Are appropriate measures in place to protect the confidential nature of the negotiations?
    13. How is the company going to explain the transaction to the press?
    14. What is the structure of the corporation’s governance following the transaction?
    15. Is any corporate stock subject to accelerated vesting upon completion of the transaction?

     

    If you have any questions about fiduciary duties, or board obligations in the context of mergers, acquisitions, or sales, please feel free to post a comment below or contact inVigor Law Group.
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    The Cost of Combined CEO/Chairman

    by  • July 2, 2012 • 0 Comments

    GMI Ratings recently published a study on the cost of having a dual CEO/Chairman rather than having separate individuals for the two positions. The problem of having one person for both positions is fairly straightforward, as GMI Ratings’ study puts it:

    If the CEO is responsible for running the company, and the board is tasked with overseeing the CEO’s decisions in the interests of shareholders, how can the board properly monitor the CEO’s conduct if he or she is also serving as board chair?

    GMI’s study looked at the compensation of individuals functioning as CEO/Chairman as opposed to the cost of having different individuals in the two roles, and found that the dual CEO/Chairman earn a median of just over $16 million. CEO’s and separate chairman earn a median of just over $11 million, and CEO’s and separate, independent chairman earn just over $9.3 million. The study suggests that individuals filling both the CEO and Chairman roles may be using their influence to acquire greater compensation packages than would be appointed by independent individuals.

    The study also found that companies with a combined CEO/chairman were out-performed by companies with different individuals in the two positions.

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    Share Buybacks

    by  • June 25, 2012 • 0 Comments

    Michael Mauboussin of Legg Mason Capital Management recently published a great finance piece on share buybacks. Officers and directors of successful corporations must decide what to do with excess cash. This is an issue for many officers and directors today, as nonfinancial companies are sitting on $1.7 trillion in liquid assets. What are share buybacks? A [...]

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    Executive Pay in the News

    by  • June 17, 2012 • 0 Comments

    Executive pay continues to grab headlines. This last week two articles in particular caught my attention. NY Times: Executive Pay Continues to Increase The NY Times is reporting that executive pay is still increasing despite declining wealth among the middle class. CEO pay increased 5% and the median pay for a top 200 CEO was [...]

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    In Unusual Move, CVR Investors Seek Poison Pill

    by  • June 10, 2012 • 0 Comments

    Potential acquirers offer target shareholders a premium on the market rate for their shares. Because acquirers offer this premium, and because investors have the right to refuse the acquirer’s bid, shareholders generally do not seek poison pills to protect against takeovers. However, investors in CVR Energy recently filed a lawsuit seeking a court order which [...]

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    How An NDA Can Function As A Poison Pill

    by  • June 1, 2012 • 0 Comments

    Yesterday, in Martin Marietta v. Vulcan, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed an injunction predicated on a non-disclosure agreement which effectively prevents a hostile takeover attempt. Case Background In the spring of 2010 CEOs of both Martin Marietta and Vulcan met to discuss a potential combination of the companies. A few weeks after these discussions began, [...]

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